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CLEVE MATHEWS

0

Cleve Mathews is a professor of journalism in the S.I. Newhouse School of
Public Communications at Syracuse
Universiry. He obtained his B.A. and
M .A. from the Universiry of Michigan. Prior to entering teaching, he was
an editor on the New Ywk Times and
director of news and public affilirs for
National Public Radio. In the latter capaciry, he served as the first executive
producer of the news program "All
Things Considered." He is coauthor
with William L. Rivers of Stanford
Universiry of Ethics in the Media, to be
published next spring by Prentice-Hall.

This article is an adaptation of a chapter written for Omwsting the BoUntkJries
ofLibeml Education: The Syracuse Experiment, ed. Peter Marsh (Syracuse
Universiry Press, forthcoming).
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VER THE LAST TWO YEARS, scholars in several

different fields at Syracuse University engaged in give-andtake discussions, not about university business as happens so often in
faculty committees, but about one another's scholarly fields. These unusual encounters occurred under the auspices of a program financed
by the Mellon Foundation to examine the relationships between the
professional schools and liberal arts and sciences. Seldom do faculty
members get a chance to exchange information and views about their
disciplines. While these discussions started off rather tentatively, they
soon took on a vitality and openness that enabled those of us participating to peer across the traditional boundaries into the hearts of our
respective worlds.
We could not, of course, engage in the deeper discourses of
specialists, but we were pleased to find that we could achieve an understanding and even a degree of rigor at a shallower level. In retrospect,
our success in communicating with one another might be attributed
to two factors: (1) a confidence, perhaps naive, that oi.Ir perceptions
of each other's language were valid, and (2) a realization that the content of each field possessed an integrity and uniqueness that could engage and even excite those of us in other fields. But communication
did not come easily. Crossing the boundaries was not enough. It took
us a while to realize that in order to talk back and forth with real success, we had to operate more deliberately in an objective manner than
we normally do when engaging in scholarly discourse with others in
our own fields . This realization emerged slowly as we noticed that the
need to validate our information came up time and again as we talked
and as we discussed readings we all had submitted to further the project's
purposes.
As a journalist questioning my own field's validation of the information it conveys to the public, I was intrigued to see that the other
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fields represented in the Mellon seminar confronted some of the same
issues and that they affected our discussions. We seemed to insist on
justifying statements as a means of clarifying scholarly interpretations
of one body of knowledge to those in other fields. We could accept
subjective interpretations from one another, but we wanted more objectivity when we discussed the content of our respective disciplines.
In fact, objectivity became a theme of the project.
To no one's great surprise, there was lack of agreement about what
objectivity is. It was more important as an issue for some disciplines
than for others. And the issue presented itself in more than one way.
My journalistic orientation posed it as a kind of stance to protect information from contamination. To the literary critic, objectivity arose
from the otherness of an object being considered from the subjective
view of the subject doing the considering (I think). But all our fields
seemed to have some kind of objectivity-subjectivity element, however
defined, as part of their adherents' visions of themselves. A sense
emerged that this element provided something common to all fields
and might therefore be one vehicle for better understanding between
fields.
The question of objectivity was raised most insistently for the seminar
by artist Robert Irwin and historian Thomas Kuhn, whose views were
set forth in seminar readings.' The two men did so by contesting objectivity. It is not surprising that Irwin, presumably more concerned
with conveying subjective feelings than facts, should reject objectivity.
But Irwin persistently insisted on reasoning his way-slowly,
deliberately-to his artistic expressions. At times he seemed determined
to eliminate any arbitrary or superfluous elements that might bias one's
perceptions of his art as he stripped away all imagery from the unmediated "phenomenal presence'' that he said a work of art was all about .
If this leads to presenting an empty room as an exhibit, it nevertheless
succeeds in forcing people to ask what it is all about . Yet Irwin ended
up rejecting the "logic" of the scientist that cuts the world into slices
and doesn't deal with its overall complexities. He accepted, instead,
the approach of"reason:' which intuitively grapples with the situation
as a whole. He found hope in those who work "beyond the techniques
of their disciplines:' which seemed to be his warning against the constraints of objectivity.2
Kuhn was concerned with explaining the development of science,
and he was more complex than Irwin in his view of the logic of science.
He saw science progressing through the replacement of one set of theory that is unable to account for a serious anomaly by another body
of theory that can account for it. Kuhn called such a set of theory a
paradigm. The new set of theory attracts a community of scientists committed to articulating and applying that theory. Within that community of scientists, an objective kind of logic prevails in the development
of the paradigm's potential. But science progresses through the rise of
new paradigms in a series of discontinuous steps brought about by
breakthroughs that displace or resolve anomalies troubling earlier
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Lawrence Weschler, Seeing Is Forgetting: The Name of the Thing One Sees: A
Lift ofContempomry Artist Robert Irwin

1.

(Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1982); T. S. Kuhn, The Structure
ofScientific Revolutions, 2nd ed. , enlarged (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1970).

2. Weschler, Seeing Is Forgetting, 137.
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A. Shweder, "Storytelling among
the Anthropologists," New York Times
Book Review, 28 September 1986, 1,
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paradigms. The logic of normal science does not permit effective communication between paradigms. A scientist "converted" to one paradigm
cannot accept all the explanations acceptable in another. This incommensurable quality vitiates the traditional function of objectivity, which
is to enable any scientist to make an independent check of some other
scientist's assertion of truth .3
The views of Irwin and Kuhn are forms of idealism, in tune with
a good deal of modern thinking from Immanuel Kant to today's
phenomenologists. Objectivity to such thinkers is an unobtainable ideal,
and trying to live up to it may not be the proper thing to do. Since
it is an ideal, it can be applied only through imperfect means, which
may cause more harm than good.
Objectivity encounters less criticism from those who operate as
realists or empiricists. To them objectivity serves more as an instrument
than as a concept. It has been defined by one of Kuhn's critics, Israel
Scheffler, as "fair control over assertion;' and he saw commitment to
such control as the basis of the scientific attitude of impartiality and
detachment. Scientists, Scheffler said, are no more naturally impartial
than anyone else, but the scientific habits of mind reflected in such
objectivity are compatible with passionate advocacy, strong faith, intuitive conjecture, and imaginative speculation .4 So objectivity provides
a way of preventing error that might arise from more subjective factors .
The debate between idealism and realism has a long and sophisticated history, which the Mellon Foundation seminar did not try to
pursue. Yet the issues of that debate cropped up in various forms as
the disciplines encountered one another. A warning against fulling into
the trap of dualistic analogies was raised in an article by Richard A.
Shweder circulated to members of the seminar. It warned of simply
accepting the dichotomy that one can either "tell it as it is" or find
the answer through "divine" revelation.5
Shweder said good writers of ethnography are casuists who take the
perspective of others and thus get outside themselves. Perhaps journalists, seeking to reach their audience more effectively by putting themselves in their readers' and viewers' places, tend to become casuistic.
Yet in conveying their pictures of the world, implicitly framed by rights
and wrongs, they find objectivity a comfortable, credible way of validating their information.
I said before that a look at the debate over objectivity could provide us with a sense of the quality of knowledge of a field . Let me offer
such a view of the debate in the field of journalism.

lI

~ghts

r:E TURBULENCE OF THE 1960S, first over civil

and later over Vietnam, brought to a head reactions that
had been long developing among journalists to what was seen as a formulistic kind of automatic objectivity. A decade earlier, Senator Joseph
McCarthy had exploited journalistic routines that validated controversial
info~mation by attributing it to a credible source. After all, a United
States senator was a newsworthy source, and attributing unfounded
cha~es to him was all that was required by traditional objectivity. The

Published by SURFACE, 1987

3

Syracuse Scholar (1979-1991), Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [1987], Art. 8
84-SYRACUSE SCHOLAR

press sought to avoid the trap revealed by McCarthy by modifying the
objectivity routines to encourage reporters to quote participants on both
sides of an issue in the same report, if possible.
The 1960s put even this modified view of journalistic objectivity under great strain. Reporters, contending with deceptive information issued by official sources and with special interests dramatically thrusting
forth their own visions, sought to tell the truth as they saw it. Sometimes that truth was quite subjective. The mainline press resisted subjective reporting.
The classic view of journalistic objectivity was restated in a modern
form on 7 October 1969 by A. M. Rosenthal, then managing editor
and later executive editor of the New York Times. In a memorandum
to guide his reporters and editors in dealing with the pressures of the
Vietnam period, he called for preserving "the basic character of the
paper." He told the staff that the newspaper's character rested on: 6

The belief that although total objectivity may be impossible because
every story is written by a human being, the duty of every reporter and
ediror is to strive for as much objectivity as possible.
The belief that no matter how engaged the reporter is emotionally
he tries as best he can to disengage himself when he sits dmvn at the
typewriter.
The beliefthat expression ofpersonal opinion should be excluded from
the news columns.
The belief that our own perjorative phrases should be excluded, and
so should anonymous charges against people or institutions.
The beliefthat every accused man or institution should have the immediate right of reply.
The belief that we should not use a typewriter to stick our fingers
in people's eyes just because we have the power to do so.
The belief that presenting both sides of an issue is not hedging but
the essence of responsible journalism.

6. The author of this article was

a member of the Times staff at
the time.

While saying that "our business is fucts;' Rosenthal asserted that "a
social movement, a change in life styles, a trend in music or art, an
emotion spreading among people, can be as real a fact as a speech or
a parade." He said he was not talking about cold, dry reporting, just
fuir reporting. "The nature ofThe Times;' he concluded, "rests on what
can be demonstrated, what can be reported, dissected, analyzed, rather
than on what can simply be labeled or characterized or caricaturized."
If Rosenthal represented the establishment view, perhaps Hunter
Thompson dramatized the alternative view. Writing in Fear and Loathing on the Campaign Trail, about his objectivity, he said:

Well, my docror says it swole up and busted about ten years ago. The
only thing I ever saw that came cwse to Objective journalism was a cwsedcirr:uit TV set-up that watched shoplifters in the General Store at Woody
Creek, CoWrado. I always admired that machine, but I noticed that
nobody paid much attention to it until one of those known, heavy, outfront shoplifters came into the place. . . but when that happened everybody got so excited that the thief had to do something quick, like buy
a green popsicle or a can of Coors and get out of the place immediately.
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n . Jonathan Alter, "The Two Faces of
Breslin ;' Newsweek, 12 May 1983, 74.

Discl!fJering the News:
A Social History of American Newspapers
(New York: Basic Books, 1978), 162-63.
12. M . Schudson,

So much for Objective Journalism. Dorrt bother to kJok for it here1Wt under any byline of mine; or anyone else>s I can think of With
the possible exceptWn ofthings like box scores, mce results and stock market
tabulations) there is 1W such thing as Objective Journalism. The phrase
itself is a pompous contradiction in terms?
Not all the critics of traditional objectivity were so extreme, but many
sympathized with Thompson's views.
Anthony Smith, in Goodbye Gutenberg) saw objectivity as partly a
response to the chaos in the international political sphere. He said, "It
fostered the collection of information on the basis of a special diction,
which restricted the definition of a statement to that which could be
assented to by all.''8
Smith's example of an objectivity suitable to the times was that of
Michael Herr. In Herr's book Dispatches,9 a collection of his reports
from Vietnam, Smith found that "one can see something of what has
endured of the new strains of reporting: a deep commitment to straight
facts and background, suffused with the passions of an individual who
feels free to use his emotions as a guide to the event while holding back
from pressing opinions of a political kind-the reporter offering his experience as part of his material without prejudicing accuracy or objectivity."10
A current example of reporting of the Thompson-Herr kind is that
of Jimmy Breslin. Newsweek wrote of him in the spring of 1986, "Breslin tries to get the details right, but generally believes that a contest
between a particular fact and the absolute truth (as he defines it) is
not really any contest at all ." The magazine said Breslin admitted the
details in a report he filed about the Three Mile Island nuclear accident were wrong, but he insisted "the absolute truth of the column
was overwhelming.""
A major complaint by the young reporters of the Vietnam era was
that traditional objectivity supported the status quo and thus was not
really objective. Press historian Michael Schudson noted in his Discovering the News that the critics charged the establishment journalists were
political whether they intended to be or not. "Their political impact
lay not in what they openly advocated but in the unexamined assumptions on which they based their professional practice and, most of all,
in their conformity to the conventions of objective reporting." Schudson said traditional objectivity had become not an ideal, but a mystification. "The slant of journalism lay not in explicit bias but in the social
structure of news gathering which reinforced official viewpoints of social reality." 12

lI

~oved

r : E "SOCIAL STRUCTURE of news gathering'' has
a fruitful field for media sociologists trying to find out
what causes journalists to do what they do. The dogma of objectivity
quickly aroused their interest. Herbert Gans found wide-scale doubts
about objectivity in the 1960s and 1970s but attributed the persistence
of claims of objectivity to the need to protect journalistic credibility
and to the fact that journalism is a low-cost kind of information
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gathering. Both reasons are basically commercial. In the first case, credibility is seen as essential to hold the audience that is the ultimate source
of revenue. In the second case, the media have to rely on knowledgeable sources and other information collectors because it would raise
the cost of news too much to develop the expertise and the capacity
needed to gather the information on a timely basis themselves.13
Additional reasons for the traditional form of objectivity were detected by other media researchers. Gaye Tuchman asserted that objectivity was a strategic ritual designed to protect journalists who must
make numerous quick decisions about the quality of their news. The
speed with which the news becomes stale prevents the journalists from
determining the accuracy of their information, so they attribute it to
their sources as a way of validating it.14
E. Barbara Phillips developed this line of thought and contended
that daily journalism encourages a lack of expertise and promotes a nonsystematic, copying-machine kind of concrete information.15 This supports the distinction made much earlier by Robert Park that journalistic
information merely provides "acquaintance with" facts rather than the
"understanding of" them.16
The reliance on sources implicit in journalistic objectivity has become a key part of current theories that the sources and the media collaborate to construct the picture of reality that is presented to the
audience. This is the conclusion to which a model by an early champion of objectivity, Walter Lippmann, has led. He asserted that the
media contribute to the picture of the world that resides in the heads
of members of the public.17 But this phenomenon is frequently offered
as a reason to reject the idea of objectivity because the reality that is
constructed results from the special interests of those constructing it.
The term "reality;' of course, is not really reality but instead a fabricated kind of ideal in the sense that it exists in the minds of members
of the public. So the long debate between idealism and realism emerges
anew in a special formulation at the center of todays world of media
theory and research.

0

NE WILL FIND similar debates going on in other fields
In literary criticism, for example, Terry Eagleton's Literary
Theory: An Introductimr- 8 and such works as Raman Selden's Criticism and
Objectivitj- 9 could sensitize one to the depth and diversity of the elements that contribute to meaning. Selden, in fact, found the objectivity of historical criticism growing out of a "structural plurality" of
forces that interact to determine the meaning of a message. While these
forces are not randomly independent, their numerous conjunctures give
rise to an overdetermination of meanings that makes the "true'' meaning of a text indeterminate, one among many possible interpretations.
This results in a complexly structured discourse that Selden found more
suitable for giving an objective reading than a subjective one.
The conjuncture of forces at the receiving end of the message also
acts to determine the meaning. We operate in a world of perceptions,
which might cause some to accept the view of philosopher Ludwig
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Wittgenstein that objectivity is the acceptance of appearances. If, as
to Wittgenstein, the world is an expressive phenomenon rather than
a logical, causal one, then the stance of objectivity loses its anchor to
objects, the link responsible for the term itself.2°
Phenomenologist Edmund Husser! placed the fact-world of time
and space "out there'' in brackets beyond judgment. Asserting that objects and events cannot be apprehended in neutral fashion in any case,
he followed pure subjective processes, rejecting the testimony of others
in confronting the givenness of experience, in "an unremitting assault
on the peak of certitude." He insisted on shifting the focus of attention from specific fact to essential and universal qualities? 1 Husser! argued that while reason could demonstrate the truth, it could not
persuade people that truth was desirable. Only by an intentional act
of will can a person choose to bring value and truth together.22
Scholars engrossed in the debate over the ethical behavior of the
media draw on the phenomenologists' position to make their arguments. Theodore L. Glasser argued that objectivity makes it difficult
for journalism to consider ethical questions. Leading off a series on objectivity in the Qftill, the publication of the Society of Professional Journalists, he wrote:

Since news exists aout there» -apparently independent of the
reporter-journalists carrt be held responsible for it. And since they are
not responsible for the news being there, huw can we expect journalists
to be responsible fin: the consequences of merely reporting it?
What objectivity has brought about, in short, is a disregard for the
consequences of newsmaking?3
What stronger argument for exposing journalism and other students
to debates in various fields about objectivity? Perhaps they might then
be in a better position to answer a question raised by an engineer in
the Mellon seminar's discussions: "Is objectivity always better?" If they
can't answer the question, maybe they would at least recognize that
Husserl's intentional act of will for bringing value and truth together
is too often absent .

F

24.

Ibid.

Overend, Social Idealism and the
Problem of Objectivity (St. Lucia:
University of Queensland Press, 1983),
25. T.

190 .
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ROM A DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE, the realists' side
of the debate over objectivity appeals to the empirical tradition
of journalists, but journalists have not probed this argument deeply.
In fact, Glasser blamed the journalist's "naively empirical view of the
world" for the "burden of objectivity;' but he seemed to be putting
more emphasis on the "empirical" than on the "naively."24
Social realists find no crucial distinction to be made between facts
and values. Tronn Overend even argued that there was no fundamental distinction between ethics and the social sciences. Overend said ethics
could be seen as a branch of social inquiry concerned with mapping
out the empirical character of good and evil?5 The approach in such
an analysis is descriptive rather than the prescriptive one common in
studying ethics. Such issues as freedom and responsibility, not to mention obligation, are eliminated as characteristics of ethical facts .
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Realists like J. Anderson, author of Studies in Empirical Philosophy,
conceive their practice of objectivity in terms of disinterest. This is
brought out by their rejection of advocacy and insistence "on the facts,
to expound and expose, let the results be what they may." 26 A current
journalistic formulation that approaches this view of disinterest was
given by James Boylan, professor of journalism at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, in reviewing Dan Schiller's Objectivity and the
News for the Columbia Journalism Review. "Objectivity;' he wrote, "has
gradually come to be understood not only as an impersonal, 'balanced'
style of newswriting (which is the commonplace, or newsroom, sense
of the word), but also as representing the broader claim of journalism
for its position in society, the one that speaks for the general interest."27
This position comes close to saying that the body of knowledge to
which the profession of journalism applies its skills is not journalism,
but the bodies of knowledge in the other disciplines. The profession
of journalism may not then be a profession unto itself, but a form of
professional practice configured to tap into the other disciplines and
professions while asserting a claim to serve the general interest of the
public by disseminating timely, though superficial, information arising from those fields . Superficial here does not mean unimportant, but
rather is closer to meaning adequate for satisfying public expectations.
Boylan's formulation places establishment journalism somewhere between the disinterest advocated by the philosophic realists and the interest implicit in consciously collaborating to construct a mediated
reality. His position may fall short of drawing a clear guideline, but
it acts to move journalism somewhat beyond any automatic balancing
of opinionated statements to a perspective based on the journalists' understanding of society's interests.

26 . J. Anderson, Studies in Empirical
Philosophy (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1963), 287; cited by Overend, Social
Idealism, 195.

27 . J. Boylan, "Infancy of Objectivity;'
Columbia j()Urnalism Review 20 (September-October 1981): 61-63.

lI~E~rthered

UNDERSTANDING OF SOCIETY'S interests is

by the cross-disciplinary education that served as a goal
of the Mellon Foundation seminar. The fact that such an educational
process took place among the participating fuculty members is encouraging. It bodes well for the belief that students would benefit from courses
designed to illuminate the elements that link liberal and professional
education.
Objectivity can be one such element. By examining the ways various disciplines validate the truth of the bodies of knowledge they build,
students may avoid an objectivity trap that threatens the professions.
Alvin W. Gouldner warned of this trap in an article addressed to sociologists, but his warning might well apply to other fields . "Professions;' he wrote, "do not tend to see value commitments as questions
of personal commitment but tend, instead, simply to treat the values
they transmit as non-problematic givens." The result is that "the growth
of professionalism means the substitution of a routine and banal code
of ethics for a concern with the serious kind of morality on which alone
objectivity might rest ."'8
Gouldner's concern about professions' tendency to bury the truthrevealing queries that encumber efficient practice was reflected in our
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seminar discussions. Peter Marsh, as discussion leader, summed up the
difference between disciplines and professions as to objectivity: "The
question of objective criteria is much closer to the surface in the disciplines!'
Students in the professional schools may thus encounter those basic
criteria of objectivity more readily in their liberal arts courses than in
the professional courses that emphasize practice. The courses designed
by the seminar participants, including those to be taught in the professional schools, may encourage students to apply such criteria across the
boundaries between fields. The topic is one that arouses interest. In
a course developed in the Mellon seminar for the School of Public Communications, the students demonstrated that interest. Sharon Hollenback, my colleague in the school's television and film department, and
I jointly taught the course in the fall of 1986 . She mentioned that I
had done a chapter for a book based on the Mellon seminar designed
to probe a bit into objectivity and that I had expressed doubts about
the concept as practiced by journalists generally. We then tried to pass
on to the topic scheduled for the day, but the students would not let us.
"So what did you conclude objectivity is?" one asked. Sharon smiled
as I danced around the question. Although I squirmed under the questioning, I was pleased by the rather passionate kind of inquiry it revealed . The fact that I could not come up with a satisfactory answer
did not dismay the students. They seemed, in fact, to look at the inquiry itself as one for them to conduct on their own . We had agreed
earlier in the course that freedom is redefined each generation by the
way people use it. Objectivity seemed to fall into a similar category.
And the students were ready to work out their own meanings of objectivity by putting it to the same kind of practical test.
This experience made me feel that objectivity is a subject that can
be examined critically and feelingly by students in all fields. It reflected
our experience in the seminar's discussions, which came to see objectivity not as the path to truth, but as a means, varying among fields,
for improving the mutual understanding and respect among disciplines
and professions.
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